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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BEATRICE RACKHAM,

Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7453

CLARENCE RACKHA1vt:,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was brought by the plaintiff and appellant
against the defendant and respondent to dissolve the bonds
of matrimony existing between said parties, to determine
the custody of the three minor children, Barbara, Charus and
Charlby, and to arrive at a property settlement. The appellant
charged acts of physical and mental cruelty which will hereafter be fully set out. The respondent denied the acts of
cruelty alleged by the appellant and filed a counter claim
charging the appellant with acts of cruelty toward the re3
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spondent and praying for a divorce and property settlement
and custody of the minor children.
The issue being joined, the matter was tried before the
court sitting without a jury. The court found the issues on
the cause of divorce in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff and entered his findings in accordance therewith.
The court made a property settlement on an alleged oral stipulation dictated into the record by the attorneys for the parties
and divided the property along the lines of said stipulation.
Two of the minor children having married during the pendency
and trial of the action the matter of custody became moot and
the court did not pass thereon. The custody of the other
minor child was not fixed by the court for the reason that he
had joined the army and was serving with the armed forces at
the time the decree was entered.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married in Ogden, Utah on May 20,
1919. Each party had been an actual and bona fide resident
of Weber County for more than three months immediately
prior to the commencement of the action. Eight children
have been born as the result of said union. At the time of
filing said complaint three of the children were minors. During
the pendency of the action, Barbara was married. During trial
Charlby was married and Charus went in the armed services
of the United States.
Appellant alleges that the respondent is addicted to the
excessive use of intoxicating liquor. She testified, T. 3, that

4
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he used two or three fifths a day on an average. Sometimes
three or four per day to treat his friends. That "He was drunk
every night for three months" T. 3. Appellant took nine
liquor permits out of respondent's shirt pockets (Exhibit A)
T. 3. He had additional permits.
"He has a box full of them, like a deck of cards."
As the Gas Sav Station where respondent works, she
discussed the matter with him and respondent said, "Didn't
give a Goddam. I got one liquor permit. I will get someone
else to get another." T 3.
Respondent did not start drinking until parties moved
to Clearfield fifteen or sixteen years ago and not excessively
until the respondent started to work for Gas Sav. T. 4. Respondent drank heavily for about last five years and came home
intoxicated every night or every second night. T. 5.
"This is the first time I have seen him sober for years, is
right now." T. 5.
When under the influence of intoxicating liquor "he was
just like he had a drug on him. He was like a <;:razy man who
threatened to kill you, choke you, he put me out doors." T. 5.
About four years ago the parties were up in Weber Canyon
celebrating the return of their son Arnold from the army. Mr.
Rackham was dancing with Mrs. Welker, who had been drink·
ing with him on a prior occasion. T. 7. Mrs. Rackham walked
to her and said,
"Young lady, why do you want to flirt with my husbandl
He has eight children."

5
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Mrs. Welker said, "You dirty Son of a Bitch, I have got .
five children of my own." Mrs. Welker indicated if Mrs. Rackham was not wearing glasses she would knock her face in. Mrs.
Rackham grabbed her by the arms and pushed her against the
wall and said,
"You leave my husband alone." T. 7. Mr. Rackham
called Mrs. Rackham vile and obscene names, T. 8., and in
the presenc~ of a large crowd tore off her clothes. T. 8.
Mrs. Rackham had been working on an apartment to get
it ready for renting. Coming home late, Mr. Rackham
"smacked" her in the face, knocked her glasses across the room
and injured the nerve above her eyebrow. She has often had
to have treatment at the doctor's. T. 9. Called her vile
names, accused her of improper conduct. T. 9.
At the Gas Sav Station, l\1r. Rackham took Mrs. Rackham's purse. He was going to drive away with it. She tried
to reach in the truck to get the purse. He twisted her arm.
She testified "he smacked my head against the iron on the
car door, injuring the vertebra of my neck, and pushed me
out without giving me my purse." T. 10. He took the key
to her safety deposit box and other things valuable to him.

T. 11.
Mrs. Rackham had saved money and put it in an old
phonograph. She told Mr. Rackham that she wanted to build
a home with the money. She was seven and a half months
along with a baby. He fought with Mrs. Rackham at this
time. He weighed 225 lbs. He stood on Mrs. Rackham and
6
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jumped up and down and choked her and she lost the baby.
The baby was born dead. T. 12.
:Mr. Rackham threw a chromium chair at Mrs. Rackham
and missed her. He called her vile names. T. 13.
On May 16th 1\frs. Rackham wanted Mr. Rackham to
take her to tt'le dance to celebrate their wedding anniversary.
Mr. Rackham came home drunk. She tried to fix him up with
cold packs. He did not revive. Mrs. Rackham went to the
dance with her son and his wife. On returning home she
had to knock on the door to get in. Mr. Rackham grabbed her
by the dress, calling her obscene names. Mrs. Rackham ran
into the hall to the room where son Arnold was. Arnold protected her. The next morning she sued for divorce. T. 15.
Mrs. Rackham desired to buy a house from a real estate
man, Leland Gibbs. He showed her the house and she was
driving to his home when they encountered Mr. Rackham
driving his truck on the highway. Mrs. Rackham _§topped her
car. Mr. Rackham stopped and came over to Mrs. Rackham's
car with a crank in his hand. She locked the door from the
inside. She tried to drive away but he drove right into the
side of her car with his truck. T. 16.
On several occasions, Mr. Rackham called renters of Mrs.
Rackham vile and obscene names. T. 16, 17.
About three years ago on the 24th of July, Mr. Rackham
took Mrs. Rackham, Ida Grasenti, Angelo Grasenti and Fannie
Dellamore to Idaho in his truck. They stopped at Ida Grasenti' s
father's home. Mrs. Rackham was assisting in the preparation
of a meal. Ida's mother called something in Italian and Ida
7
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came in and slapped Mrs. Rackham's face. This "tickled" Mr.
Rackham "to death." Mr. Rackham put Mrs. Rackham's arm
over his shoulder and pulled her and broke her arm. T. 19.
About five years ago the appellant was in the bathroom.
The respondent came home drunk and broke the bathroom door
in thinking someone was with Mrs. Rackham. T. 21.
Respondent sang filthy songs in the presence of the minor
children. T. 22.
About seven months ago Mr. Rackham came home about
1: 30 in the morning. He rang the front door bell. Mrs.
Rackham got up to let him in. He used vile language, told
her to get out of the house. She went out in the car then
went to the police station. Two officers returned with her.
Mr. Rackham used vile language. One policeman struck Mr.
Rackham under the heart. Mr. Rackham took $148.00 out
of Mrs. Rackham's purse. She was afraid of him and spent
the night at her sister's. T. 23.
Respondent chased appellant out of her home when he
was drunk, called her obscene names. T. 24.
About a year ago respondent ordered her out of the house
in her bare feet in the winter time. T. 24.
On Mr. Rackham's birthday in August 1946, Mrs. Rackham gave him a big birthday party. All the sons and their
wives were there. She had a big birthday cake. He came
home drunk and called them "dirty sons of bitches" and they
said, "Oh, Dad, you are just drunk. Mrs. Rackham took a
piece of birthday cake to him and he ate it and vomited. T. 26.
8
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On several occasions Mr. Rackham has been so ill from
drinking that the doctor had to be called. T. 26.
Respondent's treatment of appellant has caused her great
physical and mental suffering and distress. T. 26, 27. Mrs.
Rackham further 'testified that last year before the complaint
was filed she went to try and get Mr. Rackham to come home
as Chams was joining the Boy Scouts or National Guard. Mr.
Rackham said, "The reason he is joining the National Guard
is because of your actions, because you are such a G- DSon of a B--. T. 29.
On three or four occasions, 11r. Rackham did not come
home all night. "He met some friends and was drinking and
gambling." T. 29.
This is the fourth time appellant has filed divorce against
respondent. T. 29.
~Mrs.

Rackham made $800.00 renting bathing suits at the
Hermitage. She wanted to build a home, told Mr. Rackham
and he struck her and broke her nose. T. 35.
Edward A. Johnstone, the custodian of the sales slips
of Utah Liquor Control" Commission, testified that purchases
of whiskey were made on permit No. 50083 issued to Clarence
Rackham, 2300 Lincoln, T. 404, in January 1947 in the amount
of $99.31, February $77.98, March $120.74, April $78.50,
May $104.74 and June $81.78. One bottle of wine totaling 66
cents is included. All the rest was whiskey. T. 408.
The appellant has acquired a number of tracts of real
property. In 1920 she purchased the first tract of land, being
9
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a vacant lot, from Glen Vance for $300.00. She borrowed the
money to pay for this property from her father. She built
a basement, put in a foundation and constructed a home known
as 2 35 36th Street on credit received from the Wheelwright
Lumber Company. The parties lived in the property a short
time and sold the same to appellant's father, J. A. Stephens
for $2400.00. She paid the bills for construction of the house
and had a few hundred dollars left. T. 113.
In 1923 appellant purchased from Dr. Allen the property
at 207 35th St. consisting of a two-room house and a lot facing
Lincoln Street. Purchase price $1000.00. Two rooms were
built on the house and the same was shingled. Rented two
rooms for $18.00 per month. Years later the house was sold
to John White for $1200.00. T. 114.
About the same year the appellant built a house at 3506
Lincoln Street. Three rooms were added and this property
was sold in 1946 for $5000.00 to Ellen J. King. This property
was completed in 1929. T. 115. Appellant got old bricks
and. built the house and respondent did not know about it.
T. 35. Rented three apartments for $100.00 per month and
applied rentals on purchase of other property. T. 40.
In 1929 Appellant purchased the property at 219 27th
Street for $800.00 from Martha Hope. She obtained the
money for this purchase from the sale of a car which she had
accumulated from her earnings. She remodeled the property
and rented it for $40.00 per month until 1933 or 1934 when
she sold it to Mr. Fajuka for $3200. T. 116.
Mr. Rackham mortgaged the property at 3506 Lincoln
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Street for $1500.00 and used the money for his own purposes.
T. 116.
In 1931 appellant purchased the property at 2703 Wall
from Federal Building & Loan Association for $295.00, $50.00
down and $10.00 per month. Two rooms were remodeled and
Mr. Rackham put shingles on the back part of the house. This
portion has leaked for three years. T. 117, 118.
In 1932 appellant purchased the property at 128 27th
Street and 132 27th Street. On 128 was located an old frame
two-story house which appellant rented to colored people.
132 had an old two-story adobe house which she rented to
colored people. Purchase price for the two properties was
$1600.00. 128 27th Street was sold to John Newbill. 132
27th Street was sold to a colored lady for $7000.00. T. 118.
Appellant purchased this property while respondent was away
and fixed it up.
In 1934-35 purchased 158 27th Street from an Italian
woman for $1800.00. A small down payment was made and
the balance was paid from rentals. The property was remodeled
into six apartments. Mr. Rackham did none of the remodeling. The place was sold for $3500.00 and is one of the escrows
now held by Commercial Security Bank. T. 119, 120.
In 1934 or 35 appellant purchased the property at 2727
Lincoln Street consiting of a three-story brick building with
a barn in the rear for $1800.00. The front building was
remodeled into 11 apartments and the barn into one. She
sold the property was $11,000.00 but only received $400.00.
The property is now being rented for $200 per month. T. 120.

11
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In 193 7 appellant purchased property at 2733 Grant
Avenue from Mr. McGuire for $1800.00, $300.00 down and
the balance in installments. Th~s property was remodeled into
six unit apartments. She sold this property in 1946 to Mr.
Schrood for $3000.00. She purchased $4000.00 face value
war bonds with the money. T. 121.
In 1941 appelant purchased 2725-2727 Grant Avenue from
Thomas Wilson for $5300 cash. T. 122. Mrs. Rackham got
the money to pay for this property out of her safety deposit
box at First Security Bank. She still has this property. T. 123.
In 1943 appellant purchased the Riverdale property for
$6700.00. She took $1700.00 from the joint savings account
of the appellant and respondent from the Commercial Securitj
Bank. She took $2500.00 out of her safety deposit box at
Commercial Security Bank and the balance of $2500.00 she
obtained from other sources belonging to her. T. 124.
In May 1946 appellant purchased twelve $1000.00 face
value war bonds. T. 127.
In June 1946 appellant purchased five $1000.00 war
bonds.

T. 129.

In June 1947, appellant purchased the property at 1814
South West Temple Street, Salt Lake City, for the sum of
$8000.00 for the house and $500.00 for the furniture. She
cashed ten war bonds and paid the $7500.00 plus $1000.00
in cash. T. 71, 72.
Purchased property at 2639 Lincoln Street from Mr.
Frank. Four room brick house with bath between which she
remodeled into two apartments. She fixed everything up

12
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herself and rented the property for $20.00 for each side. She
paid for this property out of rentals. T. 44, 45.
The appellant purchased the furniture in her home at 334
Riverdale Road herself. T. 55.
Appellant purchased furniture for 2725 fnd 2727 Grant
herself. T. 56.
Appellant bought a 1941 Chevrolet Deluxe for $865.00.
The appellant acquired a total of thirty one $1000.00 face
value war bonds, the money for which came from rentals
and sale of property which she had acquired. T. 60.
"In addition to the labor mentioned, the appellant lathed
the house clear through, eight rooms ,ceilings, walls and everything. Lathed the house at 3506 Lincoln eight rooms. The
one at 2703 Wall she lathed and built a little breakfast room
out of cement, carried rocks on a wheelbarrow, put the rocks
in cement and dug a basement at 2506 Lincoln and handled
the brick for this house at 2506 Lincoln and carried the mortar
for the bricklayers, put in all the brick at Riverdale and lathed
the house." T. 65.
The respondent alleges that the appellant since the month
of October 1946 has been consorting and at times living with
one LeGrande Jolley, a married man at the time:~£ the commencement of this action; that the appallant has made frequent trips to Park City and Salt Lake City to see said· Jolley
and spent nights with him; T. 212; and that she remained
away from home night after night and usually over the week
ends in his company; that the appellant purchased a house in
house in Salt Lake City and furnished the same and lived
13
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there at least part of the time in one of the said house with
the said Jolley and in the same bedroom with him. To sustah
this allegation and finding, the respondent produced the testimony of William Birk, a private detective, who testified that
on October 8, 1947, some five months after the commencement
of this action, he observed the appellant in the basement at
814 South West Temple Street with Mr. Jolley. In looking
into the basement from an outside window, he testified, "Well,
I could see the whole basement. It is like looking into a place
like this except normal obstructions such as a stove, they had
regular housekeeping. More or less it looked like a temporary
setup. I could only see one bed and I remained there." The
witness further testified that the parties were preparing a meal
and eating the same; that he remained until "about a quarter
of twelve, I suppose, before the light went out." T. 185. "The
last thing I saw was darkness, but I was concerned with the
fact of whether Mrs. Rackham or Jolley left the basement,
which they did not. I could only see one bed, that is all I
saw." T. 186.
The witness further testified that he returned on Friday,
October 10, to 814 South West Temple and that "Mr. Jolley
and J\1rs. Rackham that evening had gone to a show and had
called on a sister on the way home. They returned home at
9:30 or 10 o'clock, somewhere in the nighborhood, and again
had dinner. She prepared the dinner, and while she prepared
the dinner, he had a few tours of looking around with a
flashlight. I don't know what he was looking for in the basement, perhaps fixing something. Again I stayed there and
observed the thing until the lights went out, and neither one
14
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of them left the place. It was around 12:00 o'clock or 12:30."
T. 186.
The respondent testified of having seen Mr. Jolley repairing a roof on one of the appellant's properties in Ogden.
T. 212.
Arnold, the son of appelant and respondent, testified that
he drove to Salt Lake City and spent the night with his mother
and Jolley in the basement at 814 South West Temple Street.
That he slept with Jolley in one bed and his mother slept in
another bed. T. 390.
The respondent testified that the appellant in 1943 admitted indiscretions with one Rich, and that she told him two
of her children were not his. T. 278, 279.
The other matters of cruelty on which the respondent
relies are that the appellant made all manner of false accusations against him of every imaginable wrong, calls him vile
names, screams at him in a shrill and shrewish voice, slaps
him and beats him on the head and body. T. 264. At the
conclusion of the testimony, the attorney for the appellant
and respondent dictated an oral stipulation setting out a proposed property settlement between the parties. T. 42 5.
The appellant in testifying about the purported stipulation
said, "I didn't feel right about it because he never did nuthin'
to help me accumulate what I got." T. 431.
Appellant's counsel reported to the court that he dictated
a stipulation the copy of which was submitted to Mrs. Rackham
but that he was ~ever authorized to submit it to the court by
her. T. 434.

15
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Appellant's counsel· reports to the court that the appellant
requires a ·short time in which the study the situation referring
to the stipulation. T. 435.
Thereafter, on March 31, 1949, appellant's counsel reports that "we express our willingness to abide by the stipulalation." T. 439.
Later appellant's counsel says, "Well, there are a lot of
things we won't stipulate." T. 44?.
Appellant's counsel further reports that the last stat~ment
made to the court in the case, "I want Mrs. Rackham thoroughly
satisfied so that she will feel I have done what I could for her."
No written stipulation was ever prestented to the court nor
did Mrs. Rackham personally ever consent to be bound by the
terms of the stipulation.

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR
1. The court erred in failing to award a decree of divorce

to the plaintiff.
2. The court erred in awarding a divorce to the defendant
when there was insufficient evidence to support the findings
of fact and conclusions of law as made by the trial judge.

3. The court erred in unjustly and inequitably dividing the
property of plaintiff and defendant.
4. The court erred in basing an award of the property
on a stipulation which was not in writing and which the
/plaintiff never consented to.
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD A
DECREE OF DIVORCE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Years ago this court committed itself to a rule which
has been termed by many "the rule of chivalry" which holds
that in divorce matters where the wife is seeking a divorce
on the grounds of cruelty, the court will require less evidence
than if the husband is seeking a divorce on the grounds of
cruelty.
"On the record we are persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the plaintiff, for a
number of years was guilty of nagging and faultfinding. But each spouse must expect some of that, especially the husband, who, being the stronger, ought
to take and forebear much of it with patience.
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the ground
of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much less evidence than they do the husband. That rests on sound
principles, for acts and (:Onduct on the part of a husband
may well constitute cruelty to the wife causing her
great mental distress, when similar acts and condt.iCl
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause
him great mental distress. Before a decree is granted
the husband on such ground, it ought to be a somewhat
aggravated case."
-Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781.
The above quotation is recited in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 245
P. 335; Johnson v. Johnson, 152 P2nd at 428; and Cordner
v. Cordner, 61 P2nd 601.
17
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'

There are a number ·of separate allegations of cruelty
made by the appellant which are either admitted by the testimony of the respondent directly or his answers are such that
the only reasonable inference one can draw is an admission
of the allegations.
The appellant testified that the respondent came home
drunk, rang the front door bell, that she was in the bath tub,
she couldn't get out in time and that the respondent almost
broke the front door in and came into the house and broke
the bathroom· door in thinking someone was in the bathroom
with her. T. 21.
The respondent testified that the appellant locked the
door and that it was locked by a little slide latch, that he leaned
against the door and just splintered a little piece of wood.
T. 259, 260.
The appellant testified that she told the respondent that
she had $800.00 and desired to build a home. The respondent
struck her and broke her nose. T. 35.
The respondent testified that he was driving a car and
that the appellant started to strike him and that he put up his
arm to keep her from hitting him and that she got a bloody
nose "she hit her own nose herself and that is all she got."
In response to a question by his counsel, "Was it broken?"
he replied, "No, she never complained of it being broken
until the last few years." T. 249.
The appellant testified that at a party at the Hermitage
when she made objections to the respondent flirting with
another woman that he had become incensed at her and in
18
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.....

the presence of a large crowd of people tore off her dress.
T. 7, 8.
The respondent in describing
his wife had on a black velvet dress
her and she jerked away and tore a
inches in jerking away. T. 249,

this incident testified that
with a pin, that he grabbed
piece not over two or three
250.

The appellant describes an incident m which the respondent came home about seven months prior to the filing
of the divorce at 1 : 30 in the morning and using vile language
ordered her out of the house, that she had to get out of the
house, and that she went and called the police at the police
station and upon returning found that the respondent had
taken $148.00, which she had saved for taxes, out of her
purse. T. 22, 23.
The respondent testified that he had information that
the appellant had taken the war bonds and that on confronting
her with the question whether or not they were still in the
safety deposit box she testified that they were. Whereupon,
he grabbed her purse and found a bank book and receipt where
she had turned all the bonds to Mr. Wilson and she called
the officers. He admits taking $48.00 and some other stuff
from the purse. T. 261, 262.
The appellant testified that she had saved some money in
an old phonograph and informed respondent she desired to
build a house with this money. At that time she was about
seven and a half months along with a baby, that the respondent
wanted the money she had and fought with her, stood on her,
jumped up and down and poked her until "I lost the baby
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-from it, disconnected. the cord from the afterbirth and the
baby smothered to death" and later the child was born dead.
The respondent denies the occurrence outlined in this paragraph, but in response to a question relating to the occurrence,
"Did anything of that sort ever happen," answered "Absolutely not. She did lose a child, but it was no fault of mine.''
T. 253.
The appellant testified that in August of 1946 she gave
the respondent a birthday party. She had all of her sons and
their wives there. She made a big cake and wanted to show
him a good time on his birthday. He came home drunk and
called them "dirty sons of bitches and everything" and they
said, "Oh, Dad, you are just drunk." He went to bed drunk
and the appellant took him in a piece of birthday cake. He
sat and ate it and then vomited it and soiled the linen on the
bed. T. 26.
The respondent testified that he came home on his birthday in August 1946, that he had had "a few drinks with the
boys on my birthday. We had some kids down at the house
and we sat· around friendly awhile and then I went to bed.
Question, "Did you vomit?" Answer, "No, sir. If I did, I
didn't do it and I never have as far as in the bedroom or in
bed is concerned." T. 263.
Appellant testified about two years ago respondent took
her in his truck. When she said she was going with him that
he twisted her arm, called her vile names and drove up the
dugway in Uintah and turned the lights out, that she threw
his hat out the window and she had an opportunity to get out
of the truck and get away from the respondent. T. 27.
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The respondent testified that, "She went with me one
night when I came home and she started saying 'it's just a habit
of gratifying you, so I want to leave.' She got in the Ford
pickup and refused to get out, so I drove out there somewheres,
I don't recall where it was, and she got out of the truck and
I went off and left her." T. 264.
Appellant relates an incident in which respondent ordered
her out of the house in the winter time in her bare feet. T. 23, 24.
Respondent, in response to a question, "Did anything of
that kind occur?" answered, "No, that was just about a year
ago when she went out to one of the neighbors and called
these officers." Question, "She was in her bare feet then?"
Answer, "Well, I don't recall." T. 263.
The appellant relates an incident when she went to the
Gas Sav Station that the respondent took her purse and got
into his truck, that she tried to reach over him to get the purse
and that he twisted her arm, knocked her head against the side
of the truck and injured her vertebra. T. 10.
The respondent categoricaly denies this incident, but in
response to a question, "At any other time have you ever twisted
her arm or smacked her head against the door or injured her
vertebra?" replied, "At one time she went to a chiropractor."
T. 252.
The appellant relates an incident when she and Mr. Rackham, Ida Grasenti, Angelo Grasenti, and Fannie Delamore
went to Rupert, Idaaho in a truck. They visited at the home
of Ida Grasenti's father. While appellant was assisting in
the kitchen with Ida's mother, Ida slapped her. Mrs. Rackham
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came out on the lawn where her husband was and she reported
the girl had slapped her and "it tickled him to death. Clarence
put my arm over his shoulder and pulled it and broke it right
there." Question, "Clarence broke your arm?" Answer, "Yes,
and called me everything in front of the whole bunch." T. 19.
The respondent in relating the incident admitted that she
did get kicked and hit but said he did not see it. He denied
breaking her arm, but testified, "She tried to pull away from
me. I had hold of her arm, let's see, it would be this arm
(indicating left arm) and her back and I made her come with
me; I had one arm around her and tried to make her get in
the truck. She tried to resist and go back, I made her get in
the truck." T. 258.
The appellant relates that for the past five years the
respondent has used intoxicating liquors to excess. She has
introduced in evidence (Exhibit A) a number of liquor permits
which she took from the respondent's possession and has
testified that the respondent came home every night or second
night either drunk or under the influence of intoxicating
liquors. T. 3 and 4.
Respondent admits that he takes a social drink occasionally
with friends both at his place of business and at his home, and
further indicates that when working around the place, he
takes a few "pulls." T. 246, 247.
Edward A. Johnston, a custodian for the Liquor Control
commission, testified as to the amount of whisky purchased on
the one license (Exhibit H) issued amounted to $564.05 in
the first six months of 1947. T. 408.
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In response to a question asked by appellant's counsel to
respondent, "You called her a whore on different occasions,
haven't you?" answered, "Well, I don't know as I called her
that in them words." Question, "Well, you wouldn't say you
haven't would you?" Answer, "Well, I don't recall it." T. 297.
From the testimony quoted the court can see that the
- respondent had pursued a course of mental and physical cruelty
against the appellant for a long period of time which had.
caused her both physical and mental suffering and distress.

Point 2
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DIVORCE
TO THE DEFENDANT WHEN THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS MADE BY THE
TRIAL JUDGE.
Where the respondent has made charges against the ap~
pellant of such a nature as to injure the social standing of the
appellant and bring her into disrepute, the charges must be
sustained by convincing proof.
The respondent has charged the appellant with adultery
with one LeGrande Jolley. The only proof adduced in support
of this charge is the testimony of William Birk, a private
detective, who saw the appellant and LeGrande Jolley on
October 8th and lOth, 1947, above five months after the filing of
the complaint and answer and counter claim. He testified that
he saw them in an apartment owned by the appellant in the
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evening of October 8th and 1Oth preparing a meal, then about
12:00 o'clock the lights were put out and that he remained until
about 12:30. T. 185, 186.
There is no indication of any indiscretion by the appellant,
and the son of the appellant and respondent, Arnold Rackham,
testified that LeGrande Jolley had performed certain work
on the properties of the appellant in Salt Lake City and in
Ogden. That he came to Salt Lake City with his mother and
that they stayed in the basement of the apartment owned by
her and that LeGrande Jolley slept in the basement in a
separate bed. T. 390.
The respondent testified that he had seen LeGrande
Jolley repairing a roof on one of the buildings owned by the
appellant and indicated that he wanted to shake hands with
LeGrande Jolley. T. 212. The actions of respondent on
this occasion indicate he had no ill feelings toward LeGrande
Jolley or that he suspected him of having any improper relations with. Mrs. Rackham.
The evidence adduced of indiscretions with one Harry
Woods indicates that the said Woods lived in an apartment
rented by Mrs. Rackham from September or October until
after Christmas 1942. T. 412. That sometime in the fall
of 1943, T. 411, Harry Woods and another man accompanied
Mrs. Rackham to Tremonton where she had business with an
automobile dealer, that Mr. Rackham followed and saw the
parties in an automobile together. T. 238, 240. No indiscretion or overt acts were testified to by Mr. Rackham.
Prior to 1943 he saw the appellant with one Lynn Gibbs
24
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m appellant's automobile; that Gibbs had his head on appellant's lap; that when he drove up, Mrs. Rackham locked
the car from the inside. Later Gibbs got out of the car and
ran through the fields according to Mr. Rackham's testimony.
T. 241.
Mr. Rackham testified about one Ed Stevenson, some
time between 1931 and 1932. He testified that he saw the
appellant and Ed Stevenson come out of the Ben Lomond
Hotel at 12:30 A.M.; that later the appellant received some
letters signed Ed; and that on one occasion, Ed Stevenson
came to their home when Mrs. Rackham was away and asked
Mr. Rackham if Mrs. Rackham was present. No overt acts
between the parties were testified to by Mr. Rackham. T. 233,
237.
Mr. Rackham further testified that Mrs. Rackham in 1943
asked him to return home, as he had been living separately,
because they had been married in the temple and the children
needed them. He says that Mrs. Rackham told him about her
relations with Harry Woods, Ed Stevenson and other men and
promised to put the real property in joint tenancy or to give
one-half of the property to Mr. Rackham, that after hearing
all of the purported confessions he went back to live with :i\frs.
Rackham as her husband and resumed the marital relationship. T. 265.
Certainly if any improper conduct was engaged in by Mrs.
Rackham with any of the three persons mentioned, such conduct occurred prior to 1943 and the respondent, by resuming
the marital relationship, condoned all of these acts. This
leaves us with the bare allegations of mental cruelty and the
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aireged indiscretions with LeGrande Jolley occurring some
five months after the divorce was at issue.
The appellant maintains that a reading of the evidence
will disclose that the respondent failed to maintain the burden
required where adultery is charged. Our supreme court in
the case of Doe vs. Doe, supra, holds that a mere opportunity
to commit adultery is not enough to show commission of it
and in Holm vs. Holm, 139 Pacific 93 7, the court holds that
a charge of adultery must be sustained by clear and satisfactory
proof. Certainly the respondent has failed to satisfy the
requirements of proof to sustain the allegations that the appellant was guilty of committing adultery with LeGrande
Jolley.

Point 3
THE COURT ERRED IN UNJUSTLY AND INEQUITABLY DIVIDING THE PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.
A careful perusal of the testimony will disclose that the
appellant has a sagacity in investing money in marginal real
estate and repairing and remodeling the same so that the
real estate is made to yield substantial returns. She shows
the ability to save money and to realize the greatest amount
possible in the sale of real estate. She had acquired the various
properties listed in the findings of fact and the decree. The
court should have followed the pattern set out in the case of
Foreman vs. Foreman, 176 Pacific 2nd 144, at 152 in which this
court said,
26
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"With regards to amount of award, each case goes
on its m-;n facts. The elements to be taken into consideration by the court as governing its discretion in
coming to a conclusion as to a property settlement are:
( 1) The amount and kind of property owned by each
of the parties.
( 2) Whether the property was his before coverture
or accumulated jointly.
( 3) The ability and opportunity of each to earn
money.
( 4) The financial condition and necessities of each
party.
( 5) The health of the parties.
( 6) The standard of living of the parties.
(7} The duration of the marriage.

( 8) What the wife gave up by the marriage.
(9} What age they were married.
This case followed the reasoning in Pinion vs. Pinion,
67 Pacific 2nd 265. The court did not take into consideration
elements 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 or 9 set out as guides to the court in
making determinations of property rights between the parties.
Where there is an appeal on the contention that the division
of property by the trial court was unjust and not supported
by the evidence, such contention makes it necessary for the
Appellate Court to review the evidence bearing upon these
matters and to give its judgment thereon. Openshaw vs.
Openshaw, 12 Pacific 2nd 364, at 365 and 366, citing with
approval Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 292 Pacific 214 and later
enunciated in the case of Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 63 Pacific
2nd 277 at 279.
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In determining whether or not the trial court has abused
its discretion, Hampton vs. Hampton, 47 Pacific 2nd 419 says,
"The above case and cases therein cited likewise establish the
rule that it is not necessary for this court to find a gross abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court before modifying
the judgment as to alimony. Such certainly is the rule also
with respect to an award of the division of property. This
court has indicated that the wife "if she had helped to
accumulate part of his fortune, she would ordinarily be entitled to a substantial portion, at least of that. which she aided
in accumulating depending upon all the circumstances attending
the accumulation. Pinion vs. Pinion, 67 Pacific 2nd 265.
In making a property settlement in this case, it is apparent that the trial court gave no weight as to which of the
parties had accumulated the property, but made its determination on the· mistaken basis that an oral stipulation had been
agreed upon by the parties.

Point 4
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING AN AWARD OF
THE PROPERTY ON A STIPULATION WHICH WAS
NOT IN WRITING AND WHICH THE PLAINTIFF
NEVER CONSENTED TO.
The rule is almost universal that an attorney who is clothed
with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no implied power by virtue of his
general retainer to comprise and settle his client's claim or
cause of action. 5 Am. Juris. 318, Citing Cases.
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The implied authority of an attorney to make stipulations
is ordinarily limited to matters of procedure in the management
or prosecution of the action, in the absence of special authority
any stipulation which operates as a surrender of the substantial rights of ~~e client will not be upheld by the courts. Am.
Juris. Vol. 5, P. 315.
. . . And since an attorney may not act generally for
his client, a stipulation for a disposition of the client's property is not binding unless expressly authorized. Woerner v.
Woerner (Calif.), 15 2 Pac. 919, Bancroft Code Practice, Page
59, Vol. 1.
Attorney cannot himself settle or compromise his client's
claim and enter judgment accordingly or bind his client by an
act which amounts to a complete or partial surrender of a
substantial right. Bancroft Code Practice, Page 68, Vol. 1.
Jubilee Placer Co. v. Hofffield, 50 P 716; Turner v. Fleming,
130 P. 551 (2 RCL P 995).
Appellant's counsel dictated a proposed property settlement into the record which proposed a division of the property
of the parties on an approximately fifty-fifty basis. T. 425.
Appellant was not satisfied with the proposed settlement and
her counsel indicated she needed additional time to consider
the same. T. 435.
Respondent's counsel represented in respect to the stipulation as follows: "It is to be reduced to writing and presented
to Your Honor as the values are fixed and the court will
approve it." T. 426. Appellant's counsel in addressing the
court relative to the stipulation, "I submitted one to Mrs.
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Rackham and was never authorized to submit it to you. She
has never done it." T. 434. Appellant's counsel indicated
that he would be bound by the terms of the oral stipulation.
T. 439, but after making such statement indicated that there
were many things he would not stipulate to. T. 443.
The last statement of appellant's counsel indicates he had
some misgivings about whether or not Mrs. Rackham had
agreed to the stipulation. He said at the close of the case, "I
want Mrs. Rackham thoroughly satisfied so that she will feel
I have done what I could for her. T. 462. Mrs. Rackham
did not enter into any written agreement for the division of
the property of the parties nor did she ever orally consent
in court to the stipulation dictated into the record by her then
attorney.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that appellant's counsel
had no express nor implied authority from his client to bind her
in the stipulation for a property settlement, and as the trial
court did not make an independent determination of the property rights on the formula set out by this court, no legal
determination of the parties' property rights has been made.
Appellant respectively submits that this court should
reverse the findings of the trial court and award the divorce
to the plaintiff and instruct the trial court to take further testimony on the question of the property rights of the parties so
that an equitable and just division of the property can be made.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE,
Attorney for Appellant.
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